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Two ApPROACHES TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF HEIDEGGERIAN AND DREYFUS IAN CRITIQUES 




There exist two broad research paradigms in Artificial Intelli­
gence (AI) which differ radically in their attempts to reproduce 
human understanding through the use of computers. The dominant 
paradigm. which I call Traditional AI, has focused on formalizing the 
process of thinking into rules, symbols and representations of the 
world. As such, its roots can be found in the philosophical traditions 
of reductionism and rationalism. The second paradigm, which I call 
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), has focused onusing comput­
ers to emulate the neurological structure of the brain. Concerned less 
with formalization than underlying computational structure, its 
approachhas developed from the neurosciences, Gestalt Theory and 
work in perception. The short history of both paradigms is riddled 
with fantastic claims and unsupported predictions of success. Hurbert 
L. Dreyfus was one of the firs t to critically examine these claims-and 
concluded that Traditional AI was fundamentally and irreparably 
flawed in its approach. His criticisms, grounded in the works of 
Martin Heidegger, make an in-principle argument against the pos­
sibility of formalizing humanin telligent behavior. Traditional AI has 
approached the formalization by postulating mental representa­
tions, which both Dreyfus and Heidegger reject. Dreyfus' in-prin­
ciple argument, however, holds no weight against the non-formal­
ized, non-representational paradigm which PDP uses, and he is 
notably less critical towards it because of this. 
I believe his criticisms of Traditional AI are accurate. When 
addressing the AI project in its entirety, however, his argument 
appears to slip toward a different claim. He notes that, currently, 
"humanbeings are much more holistic [than PDP networks] ," and in 
emphasizing this holism, he suggests the minimal unit of analysis of 
intelligent behavior mayanentire human-like organism in the entire 
human culture (MVB, p. 39). Dreyfus' holism, which re-emphasizes 
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"ourneeds, desires andemotions" as well as the importance of our"... 
[having] a human-like body with appropriate physical movements, 
abilities and vulnerability to injury" appears to permit only human 
organisms to exhibit intelligent behavior (MVB, p. 39). 
Inthis essay,lhope to show whyDreyfus' in-principle argument 
correctly criticizes TraditionalAI, yetmay not address some inherent 
characteristics of PDP architectures. 1 will also suggest that his 
broader, holistic argument against AI in its entirety may not be 
justified. My strategy will be to characterize both paradigms, em­
phasizing their modes of representing information. I will review 
Dreyfus' criticisms and their roots, as expanded in an analysis of 
human understanding offered by Heidegger. 1 will show why the 
critique is applicable to Traditional AI, yet inapplicable to PDP 
systems. His transition to a holistic claimconcerning intelligence will 
thenbe evaluated, and hopefully shown to be untenable based on his 
own arguments leveled against Traditional AI. 
The computational paradigm used by Traditional AI approaches 
has been described by Newell and Simon as a physical symbol 
system. It can be characterized by its use of abstract symbols to 
represent salient features in a "microworld"-an artificially con­
structed problem domain which simulates a subset of the real world. 
Syntactic rules manipulate these symbols to reflect the processes and 
relations which occur in the microworld. The technique is powerful: 
symbols and rules are capable of representing every fact and process 
which can occur within the constraints of the explicitly defined 
problem domain. It is questionable, however, whether a system 
which uses this approach can replicate human intelligence. 
Terry Winograd's SHRDLU-a Traditional AI program which 
processed natural language sentences concerning a microworld of 
blocks, spheres and pyramids-typifies two primary problems of 
symbolic representation in microworlds. Within the restricted prob­
lem domain, SHRDLU could correctly respond to questions or 
commands such as "Can a pyramid be supported by a block?" and 
"Find a block which is taller than the one you are holding and put it 
into the box" (WeD, p. 7). Remarkable as this may seem, Dreyfus 
points out-and Winograd readily admits-that nothing even ap­
proaching an understanding of natural language is modeled in 
SHRDLU. For example, in reference to "owning," Herbert A. Simon 
remarks: 
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... SHRDLU's test of whether something is owned is 
simply whether it is tagged "owned." There is no 
intensional test of ownership, hence SHRDLU knows 
what it owns. but doesn't understand what it is to 
own something (d.WCD, p.13). 
SHRDLU cannot understand "what it is to own something" because 
it is isolated from the context in which "owning" is meaningful. 
Moreover, SHRDLU is incapable of understanding anything because 
it is not "in" a context at all-its microworld contains only 
uninterpreted facts concerning geometric objects and the relation­
ships between them. A context which provides meaning, however, 
does not consist of a body of uninterpreted facts and relations. 
"Owning" is meaningful, for example, in a context of social interac­
tions and property rights in which one participates. 
This confusion between a meaningful context and the 
uninterpreted facts which compose a microworld led Dreyfus to 
reject the idea that microworlds are "worlds" at all. 
A set of interrelated facts may constitute a universe, a 
domain, a group, etc., but it does not constitute a 
world, for a world is an organized body of objects, 
purposes, skills and practices in terms of which hu­
man activities have meaning or make sense (WCD, p. 
13). 
Thus, since the semantics of "owning" are context-sensitive to a 
human world which SHRDLU is not in, the concept of "owning" is 
meaningless to SHRDLU. 
The second fundamental problem of Traditional AI typified by 
SHRDLU concerns its method of knowledge representation. 
SHRDLU's microworld consists of explicitly statable facts and rules­
a kind of knowledge Gilbert Ryle calls "knowing that" (RyIe, p. 28). 
Thus, SHRDLU can express "that a sphere is in the box" since this is 
explicitly represented in its microworld. Yet, there is a qualitatively 
different kind of knowledge which SHRDLU is incapable of repre­
senting. Ryle calls this "knowing how"-a kind of knowledge which 
indicates a skill or capability. For example, one might know how to 
play Bach's preludes, how to swim or how to shoe a horse. Know­
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how knowledge concerns anactive doing, a performance, as opposed 
to an explicitly stated fact or rule. Such knowledge is obtained 
through learning from multiple experiences: one learns how to ride 
a bike by continually getting on the saddle and pedaling. 
This mode of acquisition reveals the qualitative difference be­
tween the two knowledge types. One cannot explicitly articulate to 
a child "how to balance" in any meaningful or helpful way. Learning 
"how to balance" is not a process of studying and memorizing facts 
concerning one's center of gravity, the effects of motion on objects 
and so forth. Even after coming to know "how to balance," one 
cannot easily articulate such facts. Dreyfus remarks "the fact that you 
can't put what you have learned into words means that know-how 
is not accessible to you in the form of facts and rules" (MOM, p. 16). 
Since SHRDLU is designed as a physical symbol system, its micro­
world necessarily consists of explicitly statable facts and ru1es. Thus, 
any knowing-how one wishes SHRDLU to have access to must be 
converted into knowing-that-a deeply problematic undertaking. 
Considering the efforts made inAI during the 1970sand beyond, 
it is dear that the criticisms concerning microworlds and the repre­
sentation of knowing-how have become influential inTraditionalAI 
theorizing. New proposals, such as Minsky's frame system or Schank's 
scripts, used complex representational structures in an attempt to 
address these issues. Consider Schank and Abelson's script system: 
A script is a structure that describes appropriate 
sequences of events in a particular context. A script is 
made up of slots and requirements about what can fill 
those slots. The structure is an interconnected whole, 
and what is in one slot affects what canbe in another. 
Scripts handle stylized everyday situations. They are 
not subject to much change, nor do they provide the 
apparatus for handling totally novel situations. 'Thus, 
a script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of 
actions that defines a well-known situation (Schank. 
p.41). . 
Scripts attempt to enrich microworlds by representing human­
world interactions, and attempt to capture the kind of common­
sense know-how humans use in everyday situations. Schank cites 
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the following short story as evidence of this: "John went to a restau­
rant. He asked the waitress for coq au mn. He paid the check and left" 
(Schank, p. 38). Human understanding embodies much more infor­
mation than presented in the story: we understand that John ate the 
coqaumn, for example, thathesatata table, ate the meal withutensils 
and so on. Human knowledge of how one eats at arestaurant allows us 
to understand this story in ways Traditional AI systems, which did 
not model human practices or common-sense, could not. Do these 
richer representational schemes offer any significant improvements ? 
Scripts offer a significant advantage in their ability to use expec­
tations, in the form of unfilled or default data slots. One such slot, for 
example, could contain information about John's sitting position at 
the table. Thus, if the story had an additional line, such as "When the 
gun fired, John hit his knee on the table," the script could account for 
John's unfortunate reflex by already having information concerning 
his leg placement beneath the table. 
We imagine that such a script, in order to handle the incredible 
amount of information encountered in a restaurant, would be qui te 
complex. Minsky, commenting on his frame system (similar in many 
regards to a script) notes, 
... the list [of facts] is not endless. It is only large, and 
one needs a large set of concepts to organize it. After 
a while one will find it getting harder to add new 
concepts, and the new ones will begin to seem less 
indispensable (WeD, p. 11). 
Minsky's approach of decomposing the common-sense knowledge 
of, say, "how to use a spoon" is characteristic of AI's information 
processing model: the use of a spoon is a conglomeration of a huge 
number of actions and rules-the degree of tension the fingers must 
use to hold the spoon, the proper angle to hold the spoonso that food 
will not slide off and so on. 
Moreover, Jerry Fodor, another Traditional AI theorist, ques­
tions the importance Ryle and Dreyfus place on the distinction 
between knOWing-how and knowing-that. He remarks, 
there is a real and important distinction between 
knowing how to do a thing and knowing how to 
34 NICHOLAS K. GRACILLA 
explainhow todothatthing. n. Butwhathas this to do 
with the relation between knowing how and know­
ing that" (Fodor, p. 71)? 
In refuting one's inability to articulate knowing-how as evidence of 
a qualitatively different kind of knowledge, Fodor offers a distinc­
tion between mental competences or skilled abilities and mental 
traits-like intelligence or sensibility. Knowing-how to do some­
thing is evidence of a competency, but not necessarily a trait like 
intelligence. Moreover, traits like intelligence are not dependent on 
competencies. By drawing this distinction, he suggests that, 
if John is intelligent, there is no specific activity he 
need be good at ... being intelligent is not a matter of 
doing something ... [since] "Being intelligent" and 
"being stupid" donotname actions or types of actions 
(Fodor, p. 72). 
He suggests that knOWing-how appears to have the character of a 
qualitatively different kind of knowledge only because humans have 
no conscious access to it: we must, subconsciously, rapidly process 
large amounts of knowing-that knowledge in every action and 
ability. Thus, having larger amounts of information in richer repre­
sentational schemes presumably addresses both problems of impov­
erished microworlds and the representation of commonsense know­
ing-how. 
This technique, however, has met with serious difficulties. In the 
attempt to "bolster" the information a script can contain, Traditional 
AI theorists hope to work upwards from isolated, constrained prob­
lem domains towards the world of human knowledge and experi­
ence. Yet, at every tum, more and more information must be explic­
it!y represented within the script. The magnitude of the project does 
not go unnoticed; Minsky later (1975) comments: 
Just constructing ~~owledge base is a major intellec­
tual research problem .... We still know far too little 
about the contents and structure of common-sense 
knowledge. A "minimal" common-sense system must 
"know" something aboutcause--effect, time, purpose, 
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locality, process and types of knowledge ... (Minsky, 
p.124). 
An obvious solution would be to construct a machlne which 
could move around in the world and learn to create its ownrepresen­
tations. Yet this approach has encountered a serious paradox. Richer 
knowledge representations require advances in robotic movement. 
vision and interaction to learn from the environment: yet such 
advances in robotics first require advances in knowledge represen­
tations in such fundamental areas such as representing the robot's 
ownbody, the solidity of objects, the effectsofmovement onperspec­
tive and more (WeD, p. 46). Dreyfus does not consider enriched 
representational schemes any kind of advance towards machine 
understanding at all. The problem lies in an unjustified belief con­
cerning human ability in the world: why would one consider, as 
Minsky and Fodor do, the explicit representation of humanpractices 
to be formalizable? This makes sense onI y in the context of the highl y 
constrained microworld in which a program operates, and reveals 
serious discrepancies between microworlds and the real world of 
humanexperiences. Indeed, inananalysis of the attempt to represent 
the knowledge of even a small part of the world we live in, Dreyfus 
concludes that microworlds are completely unlike the human expe­
rience of the world. He suggests that we may work in subworlds, 
such as the university or the theater, but they are not related to each 
other in an isolated mode of "composing" a larger, shared world as 
microworlds are. Human subworlds instead presuppose a larger 
unified whole, and work as local elaborations of it (WeD, p. 14). 
The attempt to gain machine understanding through enriched 
representational schemes of the world has, so far, met with failure. 
Yet Dreyfus' arguments have indicated an even deeper problem 
with the approach: the question does not concern the degree of 
complexity a representational scheme must have, but rather whethe r 
human understanding involves representations at all. To further 
develop this, I turn to Heidegger's analysis of human understand­
ing. 
Dreyfus' criticisms of AI's use of micro worlds, and his concern 
for the humancontext in general, can clearly be traced to Heidegger' s 
analysis of human existence (Dasein) Being-in the world. "Being-in" 
conveys a sense of "in" entirely different from the way objects may 
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be "in" other objects. A sphere, for example. may be "in a box" in the 
sense thatit is surrounded onthree or four sides; but this sense of "in" 
is an unengaged one: the sphere, Heidegger says, is really "along 
with" the box (Heidegger, p. 79). Humans, on the other hand, are 
very different: we are engaged in the world; we dwell in a familiar 
andinvolved way init. Heidegger notes "there isno such thing as the 
'side-by-sideness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity 
called 'world'" (Heidegger, p. 81) to emphasize that Being-in is not 
like an "object inside an object." Indeed, the world is not a thing at all, 
nor is it a composition of things. Instead, the world is a context, a 
background for which entities have always already been in. 
Entities in the world can be encountered by Dasein in two ways. 
In use, an object is ready-to-hand (Heidegger, p. 98). Heidegger's 
examples of ready-to-hand entities typically involve skilled activi­
ties, such as hammering. The hammer, when actively used, is unno­
ticed: "an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occur­
ring Thing" (Heidegger, p. 98). Thematic grasping of an entity qua 
entity requires detached contemplation, a way of revealing objects as 
present-at-hand. Thus, a hammer could be revealed as present-at­
hand-if it is sitting on a table and Dasein is analytically examining 
it, or if its head suddenly breaks when prying a nail and Dasein 
attempts to repair it. But typically entities are known in their use, as 
ready-to-hand. 
The distinction between use and detached contemplation clearly 
corresponds to the distinction between knowing-how and know­
ing-that. Heidegger's analysis, which shows that Dasein is always 
in-the-world, sets the ready-to-hand encountering of entities as the 
fundamental, typical way Dasein understands. This understanding 
is knowing-how-encountering an entity as ready-to-hand in its 
use. Revealing an entity as present-at-hand in detached contempla­
tion yields an entity qua entity. This is knowledge of the knowing­
that sort. concerning facts and information about objects distinct 
from Dasein. Thus Dreyfus notes that Being-m-the-world cannot be 
understood solely on the model of a relationship belween subject 
and object, because such amodel dpes not account for understanding 
a thing as ready-ta-hand (BW. p. 45). Heidegger, also refuting the 
subject/object model of understanding. insists that "... the perceiv­
ing of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty 
to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped 
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it ..." (Heidegger, p. 89). He refutes the traditional representational 
theory of mind, which hold that we form meaningful mental repre­
sentations of the world and manipulate them when thinking. 
Heidegger does not deny the possibility of mental phenomena: he 
does, however, reject the idea that such phenomena create "internal 
meanings" of the world. 
Traditional AI has had, as its primary focus, an analysis of the 
way humans-as-subjects "grasp" objects in the world and interpret 
them in an internal, mental sphere. This is the attempt to analyze 
understanding as a collection of knowing-that knowledge. But this 
"knowing" is only knowing the present-at-hand: it involves sym­
bolic representations of the world and the rules needed to meaning­
fully manipulate them. It completely neglects understanding as 
primarily understanding entities as ready-to-hand. Fodor's earlier 
argument that intelligence is not a skill like hammering makes this 
fundamental mistake. This is the attempt to formalize understand­
ing as something distinct from the way Dasein is in-the-world-an 
impossible project, since the world revealed ready-to-hand cannot 
be represented by a set of context-free elements. The use of a 
hammer, for example, is nested in the context of a human social 
world with purposes and roles, which need not be represented as a 
set of facts (MVB, p. 29). 
Formalizing understanding to gain commonsense knowledge is 
at an impasse because Heidegger's commonsense understanding­
everyday know-how-does not consist of procedural rules, but 
rather an unformalizable knowing-what-to-do in everyday situa­
tions (MVB, p. 33). Dreyfus suggests that a child comes to know­
what-to-do by constant exposure to the world, and that "the same 
might well be the case for the social world. If background under­
standing is indeed a skill and ifskills are based on whole patterns and 
not on rules, we would expect symbolic representations to fail to 
capture our commonsense understanding" (MVB, p. 33). 
The Heideggedan perspective provides a useful background to 
Dreyfus' criticisms of Traditional AI. The danger, however, lies in 
the ease at which one can overemphasize the holistic nature of 
human understanding. That "one cannot build up the phenomenon 
of world out of meaningless elements" (BW, p. 119) does not neces­
sarily imply that human understanding is dependent on the entire 
human culture, as Dreyfus does. To show this, I will first show how 
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the PDP approach to AI satisfies Heidegger' s and Dreyfus' criticisms 
of Traditional AI, and then critically examine Dreyfus' "wholer than 
holism" criticisms. 
In theirmost general case, PDP systems are simulations of neural 
networks found in the brain. They consist of large numbers of 
individual processing units connected together in varying degrees of 
complexity. Individual units typically perform simple computa­
tions; they process information by sending excitatory or inhibitory 
signals to other units in varying degrees of intensity, dependent 
entirely upon the signals of the units simultaneously connected to 
them. Such a network will have two primary edges of multiple 
connection lines: the first canbe considered as an input edge, where 
received information can pass through the network of connections 
and computation units to an output edge. 
A PDP network is not programmed with explicit rules nor does 
it create representations of the world to manipulate. Instead, a 
network is repeatedly exposed to "input" information concerning 
the world and "output" expected responses. By adjusting its internal 
connections, the networ k learns to associate the expected response to 
the situation. For example, one might "train" a network to predict 
weather patterns by presenting facts about the current weather 
conditions and what followed from them. The trained network could 
thenassociate similar future conditions to what had happened. More 
importantly, since there are no explicit rules concerning barometl'ic 
pressures, wind patterns, etc., the network can generalize to new 
conditions based on past experience. Salient features of new experi­
ences can be associated with past experiences, allowing for re­
sponses to conditions which the network had not seen before. 
The method of knowledge retention, too. is non-explicit and 
non-representational. Note well that Heidegger does not deny inter­
nal psychical entities or mental states-he merely denies that they 
are "internal meanings" or representations. The same holds true for 
PDP connectionist networks. In the context of weather recognition, 
the value of an individual node at some position is meaningless. No 
individual or group of nodes "represent" a rule which might state "if 
the barometric pressure is high, it is likely to be a nice day," nor is the 
value of some individual processing unit a meaningful representa­
tion of a feature in the world. 
Indeed, a trained network is only meaningful when considered 
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as a whole in the context of the world. Its internal adjustments, are 
entirely dependent on the infonnation presented. No previously 
structured system akin to a script is used to deconstruct and process 
particular salient features of the problem. Instead, problem situa­
tions are presented to the networ k, which independently determines 
which are, and which are not, useful features. 
PDP networks are consistent with Dreyfus' and Heidegger's 
accounts in several ways. First and foremost, they do not create 
internal representations in the spirit of a representational theory of 
mind. Activity certainly occurs between nodes, but this activity 
cannot be meaningfully related to external phenomena. An indi­
vidual node's value is meaningful only in the context of the entire 
network. Secondly, the network is not independent of the context of 
the situation. Its only rule-which might be stated as "adjust to suit 
the expected response"-is entirely dependent on the information 
presented as well as the expected response. Any rule-like behavior 
which a network appears to follow can not be the result of the 
formation of rules, since rules cannot be represented in the network. 
Such behavior mustbe said to be emergent: a complex activity gained 
through the interaction of processing units which are not explicitly 
concerned with the more complex overall goal (Wallich, p. 128). The 
problem of machine representations of knowing-how appears to be 
readily addressed by the emergent quality of PDP systems. Just as, 
for humans, the acquisition of such knowledge requires repeated 
practice and development, parallel acquisition in connectionist sys­
tems require repeated training sessions. 
Dreyfus recognizes the compatibility of PDP systems with his 
and Heidegger's in-principle pOSition concerning knowing-how 
representations and Being-in-the-World. Yet Dreyfus is still critical 
of network systems. He comments "Intelligent behaviol' requires as 
a background the totality of practices whichmake up the human way 
. of Being in the world ... [yet] the capability for providing such a 
background is, at present, beyond the horizon" (FMK, p. 132) and"... 
human beings are much. more holistic than neural nets. Intelligence 
has to be motivated by purposes inthe organism and goals picked up 
by the organism from an ongoing culture" (MVB, p. 39). 
It is this increasing dependence on an argument based on more 
and more holism which I find incompatible with his earlier, consis­
tent views. We say of a child, who clearly has not gained the "totality 
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of practices which make up the human way of Being in the world," 
that she is still intelligent despite this deficiency. On D:ceyfus' ac­
count, at what point could we determine that a person was intelli­
gent? How many human social practices would one have to know? 
It would be absurd to think that traveling to a country whose social 
practices were not known in their entirety would render a person 
unintelligent. 
Increased holism appears to be a quantitative argument. Yet 
Dreyfus refuted Traditional AI's attempt to use a similar argument. 
At that point, the Traditional AI approach was to include more and 
more information into highly structured representational systems. 
Dreyfus had shown that the quantity of information a Traditional AI 
system had was irrelevant: its representations had no know ledge of 
the ready-to-hand. Yet now that PDP systems meet such criteria, 
Dreyfus reverts to the quantitative argument he refuted: a PDP 
system must now have access to an entire human culture, with 
innumerable goals and purposes. 
Idonotbelieve that PDP systems are the final answer to the many 
questions involved in modeling human intelligence. Yet I have 
shown the significant advances they do offer: networks are capable 
of exhibiting the non-formalizable behavior both Dreyfus and I 
believe are vital to human understanding. This capability renders 
Dreyfus' in-principle argument against them inapplicable. 
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